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NOTES

A STATUTORY SOLUTION TO THE MISCHIEFS OF
MARKMAN v. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, IVC.'
INTRODUCTION

Infringement analysis in patent infringement actions proceeds in two steps.2 First, the scope of the patent is determined: the patent claims are interpreted or construed. 3 Second, the properly construed patent claims are compared with
the accused product or process.4 If the accused product or process sufficiently encroaches upon the patent, infringement has
occurred.5
Nearly always, to decide what the claims mean is to decide
the case.6 It is a relatively simple matter to compare the accused product or process with the patent and determine the
level of encroachment.' In the main, however, it is much more
difficult to interpret the patent claims.' Such claims are often
ambiguous and contain complex technical subject matter. As a
result, the decisionmaker vested with the task of interpreting
patent claims often must depend on extrinsic evidence, usually
expert or inventor testimony, in order to understand properly
and construe the claims.' The Supreme Court, in an apparent
' 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) [hereinafter Markman

1111.

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) [hereinafter Markman 1l].
' Markman II, 52 F.3d at 976. Patent claims are the portion of the patent
document that defines the scope of the patentee's rights. See infra note 24.
'Markman II, 52 F.3d at 976.
SId.
6 E.g., id. at 989, 993 (Mayer, J., concurring).
2

See, e-g., id.

s E.g., id. at 1002-08 (Newman, J., dissenting).
9 Markman II, 52 F.3d at 980-81; see W'mans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co.,
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effort to reduce the frequency of improper interpretations, recently abolished the jury's role in interpreting patent claims.
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,1" the question
presented to the Supreme Court was whether the interpretation of patent claims is solely a question of law or rather a
mixed question of law and fact." If the Supreme Court determined that claim interpretation is solely a question of law,
then conflicting extrinsic evidence regarding claim interpretation would never raise a question of fact and would always be
decided by the judge.' 2 If the Supreme Court determined that
claim interpretation is a mixed question of law and fact, then
disputes regarding conflicting expert testimony would need to
be resolved by the fact finder on the way to construing the
claims as a matter of law.'3
The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of patent
claims is a matter of law solely for the court to decide, and not
subject to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.'4 This
conclusion was based partially on the assertion that although
credibility determinations with regard to expert testimony
offered in support of conflicting interpretations are factual in
nature and within the jury's forte, they are rarely dispositive.'5 Furthermore, the Supreme Court articulated the highly
controversial notion that even in cases where such credibility
determinations may be dispositive, a judge's trained ability to
evaluate conflicting testimony is more significant than a jury's
to evaluate demeanor, human conduct, and truthfulability
16
ness.
This Note argues that the characterization of claim interpretation as a matter of law has created certain mischiefs that
hinder the judicial process in patent infringement cases. First,
such characterization violates the Seventh Amendment's right
to a jury trial by creating a "complexity exception" for patent

62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 100 (1858) ("[E]xperts may be examined to explain terms of
art, and the state of the art at any given time. They may explain to the court
and the jury the machines, models, or drawings exhibited.").
10 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).

n Id. at 1387; Markman II, 52 F.3d at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring).
12 See Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1395-96.
13 Markman II, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1387, 1395-96.
11 Id.
16

Id.

at 1395.
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cases. 17 Second, because legal questions are reviewed de novo
on appeal, characterization of claim interpretation as a legal
question relegates what is supposed to be the "main event" in
the adjudicatory process, the trial, to a "tryout on the road. ""
Furthermore, this Note proposes a statutory solution to
the dual mischiefs of Markman. The proposal relies on the
contention that patent claims are very often ambiguous. Thus,
the decisionmaker vested with the task of interpreting the
claims usually requires expert assistance in order to understand properly and construe the claims. Introduction of competing expert testimony on claim interpretation leads to factual
disputes regarding witness credibility and bias.' When that
happens, the mischiefs of Markman arise to hinder the judicial
process. If patent claims were less ambiguous, however, district courts would be better able to interpret patent claims
without having to depend on extrinsic evidence.
See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127-31 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (Markey, C.J., additional views). The Seventh Amendment states that
"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In SRI Intl, Chief Judge Markey explained that the "complexity exception" to
the Seventh Amendment creates a dichotomy between factual issues appropriate
for a jury to decide and factual issues appropriate for a judge to decide. SRI Intl,
775 F.2d at 1126, 1131. Under such an exception, certain factually complex cases
are determined to be too complex for juries to resolve properly, and thus, such
cases are resolved by the court, notwithstanding the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial. Id. at 1127. The Chief Judge further stated that because the Seventh
Amendment provides no such distinction, such an exception could only exist where
the complexity of certain cases is so great that it renders such suits beyond the
ability of a jury to decide by rational means with a reasonable understanding of
the evidence. Id. at 1130. Patent cases, the Chief Judge concluded, are not such
cases. Id.
"B In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), the Supreme
Court stated that "[wihen [factual] findings are based on determinations regarding
the credibility of witnesses," FED. R. CiV. P. 52(a) requires even greater deference
to the fact finder's findings than the already stringent clearly-erroneous standard.
Id. at 575. In addition, where the parties have already fought at the trial level to
persuade the fact finder that their account of the facts is the correct one, requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too
much. Id. Instead, the Court found that, "the trial on the merits should be the
'main event' rather than a 'tryout on the road.' " Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) states that 'iflindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
" E.g., Markman HI, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
7
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In this regard, this Note proposes that 35 U.S.C. § 112
("§ 112"),' o the statute that sets out disclosure requirements
for patent claims and specifications, be amended to require a
potential patentee to include in the specification a definition or
interpretation for each term of art and each technical term in
the claims, and for each word that qualifies such a term. Such
an amendment would require potential patentees to describe
their inventions in greater detail, thereby reducing much of the
ambiguity in claim terminology. By reducing ambiguity in
claim terminology, more complete disclosure by the potential
patentee would allow courts to consider only the intrinsic evidence, the patent and its prosecution history, when making
their determination. Consequently, more complete disclosure
would eliminate the court's reliance on extrinsic evidence when
construing claims as a matter of law. Thus, because the mischiefs of Markman arise only to the extent that claim interpretation as a matter of law contains a factual element, more
complete disclosure by a potential patentee, by eliminating the
court's reliance on extrinsic evidence, would likewise eliminate
the mischiefs associated with Markman.
This Note consists of five parts. Part I provides background information regarding basic patent law and patent
infringement actions. Part II reviews the facts of Markman
and the decisions of the district, circuit, and Supreme courts,
focusing on the rationale that these courts provide for the
conclusion that all aspects of patent claim interpretation are
questions of law. Part III argues that this conclusion is ill-conceived. This part illustrates the flaws in such a characterization by explaining the errors in the Supreme Court's reasoning
and identifying the negative practical consequences for both
litigants and courts-the mischiefs of Markman-that flow

20

In its present form, 35 U.S.C. § 112 states, in pertinent part, that

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).
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therefrom. Part IV analyzes statutory patent disclosure requirements under § 112 in an attempt to determine whether
these requirements adequately provide courts with an intrinsic
record enabling them to interpret claim language without resorting to extrinsic evidence. This part concludes that § 112, in
its present form, does not provide for the disclosure needed by
courts after Markman. Finally, Part V proposes a statutory
amendment to § 112 that would more adequately provide
courts with the level of disclosure necessary to avoid the mischiefs of Markman in future patent cases.
I. BACKGROUND: BASIC PATENT LAW AND PATENT
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS

Patents safeguard inventions that are new, useful, and not
obvious from the prior art-the past research-to a person of
ordinary skill in the profession at the time the invention was
made.2 ' When a patent is issued, the patentee is awarded the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the given
invention for a term beginning on the date the patent issues
and ending 20 years from the date the application for the patent was filed.'
Typically, plaintiffs in patent suits allege infringement.
Such claims are based on accusations that the defendant unlawfully made, used, or sold the patented invention in the
United States sometime during the life of the patent." Infringement analysis involves two steps: 1) construction or interpretation of asserted patent claims,24 and 2) determination
21

E.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPRTf LAW 2-18

(1992).
35 U.S.C. § 154 (West Supp. 1995).

= Markman 17, 116 S. Ct. at 1388.
The Constitution grants Congress the power =[to promote the Progre3s of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The grant of a patent advances these objectives. There are two
distinct elements of a patent- the specification and the claims. The specification
describes the invention and 'the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same...." 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1984). The claims "particularly point out and distinctly claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Id. The claims define the scope
of the patent grant and circumscribe the patentee's right of exclusivity under the
24
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of whether the accused product or process infringes such
claims once properly construed.'
Because of the scientific nature of most inventions, the
issue of infringement often involves complex technical information that may be confusing to judges and juries." As a result,
expert witnesses are often called upon to explain claim language and the state of the art." If the language and meaning
of words used in a claim are unambiguous or uncontested,
claim interpretation is a relatively simple determination.28
However, this is very seldom the case. As one district court
very lucidly pointed out:
In most cases, the parties will look first to the accused product [or
process] and describe it. Then, the parties will look at the words
used in the claim to see where an interpretation of a word or group
of words does or does not describe the accused product or process. As
to these words, the patent owner will propose a meaning that precisely describes the accused product or process. The accused infringer will do just the opposite.2

It is this typical pattern in patent infringement cases that
produces the disputes regarding the meaning of claim terms.
And, not surprisingly, it is this process that generated the
dispute in the Markman case, which centered around the
meaning of the word "inventory."
II. MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC.

A. Facts
Markman owns United States Reissue Patent No. 33,054,
entitled "Inventory Control and Reporting System for
Drycleaning Stores." ° The patent describes a system that can
monitor and report the status, location, and movement of clothing in dry-cleaning and laundry establishments.31 The
patent. See, e.g., Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1388.
E.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
21 See, e.g., Markman II, 52 F.3d at 980-81.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 979-80, 991; Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 894

F. Supp. 844, 858-59 (D. Del. 1995).
2' Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 858-59.
30

31

Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1388.
Id.; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D.
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Markman system consists of a keyboard, a data processor, and
a series of optical detectors. 2 Under the Markman system, as
customers bring in their articles of clothing for cleaning, the
employee enters information on the keyboard identifying the
customer, the type of articles being deposited, and the particular cleaning services to be performed.' The data processor
stores and processes the information entered by the employee,
associating each transaction with a specific number.' The
data processor is connected to a printer that generates records
for each transaction, including tags that are attached to individual articles or groups of articles in inventory.' The article
tags contain bar codes readable by optical detectors,"6 which
are used to call up information associated with the customer or
transaction and to generate reports containing information
such as the location of certain articles within the system and
the number of articles at a particular point in the system.'
After the articles have been cleaned, optical detection of the
bar codes can be used to organize the articles into customer
packages for delivery.'
Similarly, Westview's product includes a keyboard, a data
processor, and an optical detector.39 When a customer delivers
articles of clothing for cleaning, an employee enters on the keyboard information about the customer, articles to be cleaned,
and charges for the cleaning. 0 The system then prints out a
bar-coded invoice listing the information entered by the employee.41 However, the Westview system, unlike Markman's,
retains in memory only the invoice number, date, and cash total.' Westview's optical detector is used to compare the in-

Penn. 1991) [hereinafter Markman 11.
"Markman LI, 116 S. Ct at 1388.
Markman H, 52 F.3d at 971.
"Id.
"Id.
"Id.

Id. at 972.
Markman II, 52 F.3d at 972.
39Id.
4Id.

41
4Id.

Id.
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voice list stored by the data processor with invoices in the establishment.43 In this way, the system identifies extra or
missing invoices."
B. The District Court Decision
Markman sued Westview alleging patent infringement.
Westview answered, claiming there was no infringement because Westview's product functions only to record an inventory
of receivables by tracking invoices and transaction costs, not to
record and track an inventory of articles of clothing.45 The
dispute was based upon the meaning of the word "inventory," a
word used in Markman's independent claim 1," a portion of
the patent that delimits the patentee's rights. The case was

Markman II, 52 F.3d at 972.
"Id.
Markman I, 772 F. Supp. at 1537-38.
, In claim 1, Markman claims his invention to be
1. The inventory control and reporting system, comprising: a data input
device for manual operation by an attendant, the input device having
switch means operable to encode information relating to sequential transactions, each of the transactions having articles associated therewith, said
information including transaction identity and descriptions of each of said
articles associated with the transactions; a data processor including memory operable to record said information and means to maintain an inventory total, said data processor having means to associate sequential
transactions with unique sequential indicia and to generate at least one
report of said total and said transactions, the unique sequential indicia
and the descriptions of articles in the sequential transactions being reconcilable against one another, a dot matrix printer operable under control
of the data processor to generate a written record of the indicia associated with sequential transactions, the written record including opticallydetectable bar codes having a series of contrasting spaced bands, the bar
codes being printed only in coincidence with each said transaction and at
least part of the written record bearing a portion to be attached to said
articles; and, at least one optical scanner connected to the data processor
and operable to detect said bar codes on all articles passing a predetermined station, whereby said system can detect and localize spurious
additions to inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom.
Markman II, 52 F.3d at 972.
4" Markman III, 166 S. Ct. at 1388. An independent claim, like
all patent
claims, particularly points out and distinctly claims the subject matter which the
applicant regards as her invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984). An independent claim,
unlike a dependent claim, neither contains a reference to a claim previously set
forth nor incorporates by reference all the limitations of a claim to which it refers,
but rather sets forth an independent limitation of the subject matter claimed. Id.
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tried before a jury, which heard expert testimony regarding the
meaning of the disputed term.48
After the jury compared Markman's patent with
Westview's product, it found infringement of claim .'4 Notwithstanding the jury's verdict, however, the district court
granted Westview's renewed motion for judgment as a matter
of law, holding that the term "inventory" in Markman's patent
was a broad term covering "both cash inventory and the actual

physical inventory of articles of clothing."

°

Under this inter-

pretation, in order for a product to infringe Markman's patent,
the product must be capable of: 1) tracking invoices and trans-

action costs; and 2) tracking articles of clothing and generating
reports about their status, location, and movement throughout
the store.5 ' Since Westview's product cannot track clothing,
only invoices and transaction costs, the court held that despite

the jury's findings, Westview's product did not infringe
Markman's patent.52
C. The Federal CircuitDecision

Markman appealed, claiming it was error for the trial
court to decide the meaning of the word "inventory," notwith-

standing the contrary meaning determined by the finder of
fact.' Markman's argument was premised on the fundamen-

tal notion that it is the province of juries, not judges, to consider and weigh conflicting evidence in reaching a final decision

' Markman I, 772 F. Supp. at 1536-37. Markman's expert testified that the
word "inventory" in claim 1 meant 'cash" or "invoices! and not "articles of clothing." The District Court ruled that these definitions were contrary to: 1) the ordinary meaning of the word; and 2) the obvious meaning intended by the patentee,
as indicated in the specification and file history of the patent. Id. Ironically, at
trial neither the court nor the jury heard conflicting expert testimony with respect
to what the word "inventory" meant to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the patent was issued. See Markman II, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader, J., concurring).
Westview's interpretation was based on the intrinsic evidence, the patent and the
prosecution history. Id. Thus, as Circuit Judge Bader argued in his concurrence in
Markman I, the question presented in Markman H need not have been raised or
answered for it was not before the court. Id.
"9Markman I, 772 F. Supp. at 1536-37.
50 Id. at 1538.

5' Id. at 1537-1538.
52 Id.

Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1389.
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on the merits.'M Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("CAFC") affirmed the district court's judgment
for Westview, holding that the interpretation of patent claim
terms
a matter of law exclusively for the court to decide."5
Toissupport
their holding, the CAFC found that in considering extrinsic evidence, the district court is not making factual
findings:
IThe court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or
making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is looking to
the extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the written
document, a task it is required to perform. The district court's claim
construction, enlightened by such extrinsic evidence as may be helpful, is still based upon the patent and prosecution history. It is
therefore still construction, and is a matter of law .... ."

With regard to oral expert or inventor testimony, the
CAFC specifically stated that such testimony is entitled to "no
deference," and that it "amounts to no more than legal opinion."57 Furthermore, when extrinsic evidence offered by experts is conflicting, "such conflict does not create a question of
fact.""8 Essentially, the CAFC held that district courts shall
consider such expert testimony akin to legal argument or opinion, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.
In supporting its contention that factual questions do not
arise during claim interpretation, the CAFC made two remarkable findings. First, it stated that patent claims are never
ambiguous to one of ordinary skill in the art. 9 To support
this assertion, the CAFC noted that 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a
certain level of exactness regarding the written description of
the invention that a potential patentee must include in the
patent." In addition, the court explained that "[t]his statutory
, Markman II, 52 F.3d at 973.
$' Id. at 970-971.

56 Id. at 981 (footnote omitted). In holding that claim interpretation
never involves a question of fact, the CAFC conveniently avoided having to address the
constitutional issue. For if such claim interpretation did involve the resolution of
factual disputes, the Seventh Amendment would likely create a right to trial by
jury. E.g., Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (The
Seventh Amendment "requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall
be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to
take from the jury or to itself such prerogative.").
:7 Markman II, 52 F.3d at 983.
I
Id.
$' Id. at 986.
" Id. See supra notes 20 and 24 for the specific disclosure requirements as
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language has as its purpose the avoidance of the kind of ambiguity that allows introduction of extrinsic evidence [during
litigation]." 1 Based on these facts, the CAFC concluded that
because patent claims are sufficiently unambiguous for the
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), i.e., because the patent
was granted, there exists no factual ambiguity when those
same claims are later construed by a court of law in an infringement action.6' This is not true. As evidenced by 1) the
dispute over the word "inventory" in Markman's claim, and 2)
the disputes in many patent infringement cases,' it is clear
that claim terms are often ambiguous. The CAFO's bold assertion to the contrary came as a great surprise to many judges
and lawyers."
Second, in arguing that questions of fact do not arise in
the process of construing a patent, the CAFC equated patents
to statutes.' In justifying this comparison, the court stated
that both patents and statutes are public documents that may
create liability in third persons who were not participants in
the legislative process or the PTO proceedings.'S Thus, the
court concluded that the statutory interpretation model is an
accurate one for purposes of claim interpretation.' Consequently, because the drafters of legislation are not required to
testify in actions involving statutory interpretation, likewise,

outlined in the text of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
6' Markman II, 52 F.3d at 986.
Id. Apparently, this applies to patent claims where the parties are not litigating the invalidity of the claims for indefiniteness under 35 US.C. § 112.
Markman II implies that truly ambiguous claims, those the PTO erroneously grant
protection to, would render the patent invalid. id.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Markman HI, 52 F.3d at 990 (Mayer, J., concurring) (lilt is remarkable that
the court so casually changes its mind, especially when the... precedent was
compelled by the Seventh Amendment and not the mere preference of a sufficient
number of judges."); Joseph . Re & Joseph F. Jennings, Answers and Questions
Raised by the Federal Circuits Markman and Hilton Davis Decisions, in WINNING
STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 1995, at 877 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 423, March, 1995) ("In
essence, the Federal Circuit judicially pronounced all patent claims as without
ambiguity. This may come as a surprise to many practitioners who sometimes are
puzzled over the meaning of a claim term, and it certainly will shock many trial
judges who have presided over patent cases.") (footnote omitted).
Markman II, 52 F.3d at 987.
"Id.
6 Id.
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in patent suits, it is from the public record or intrinsic evidence only, and not from extrinsic evidence, that a court
should determine the meaning of claim language."
Although this assertion reiterates the general rule with
regard to the interpretation of legal documents, 9 it utterly ignores the one major exception to that rule-the "technical
language exception"-articulated by the Supreme Court over
one hundred years ago in Goddard v. Foster." In Goddard,
the Supreme Court held that written documents are for the
court to interpret "except when they contain technical words,
or terms of art," and where the "effect depends not merely on
the construction and meaning of the instrument, but upon extrinsic facts and circumstances, in which case the inference to
be drawn from it must be left to the jury."7 ' Given such precedent, it seemed likely that not only would the Supreme Court
grant certiorari to address this issue, but that they would reverse the CAFC's decision.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
Notwithstanding the ambiguous nature of patent claims
and the "technical language exception," both of which warrant
inquiry by a fact finder, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Markman 11.72 Although the Court investigated the

"Id.
, William & James Brown & Co. v. McGran, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 479, 493 (1840)

("T]he interpretation of written documents properly belongs to the Court, and not
to the jury.").
70 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 123 (1872).
71

Id.

at 142 (emphasis added). Justice Story espoused this very doctrine spe-

cifically with respect to the issue of patent claim interpretation twenty-eight years
earlier in the case of Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No.

17,214). In Washburn, Story stated that with
respect to [the contention] that the court was bound to state what in
point of law the invention claimed by the patentee was, I agree, that
this is generally true, so far as the construction of the words of the
patent, and specification is concerned. But then this doctrine is to be
[that] the jury are to judge of the
received with [the] qualificationg ...
meaning of words of art, and technical phrases, in commerce and manufactures, and of the surrounding circumstances, which may materially
affect, enlarge or control the meaning of the words of the patent and
specification.
Id. at 325.
72 Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1387.
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history of patent claims and Supreme Court precedent more
thoroughly than the CAFC, it found little support for its decision in these resources. "[H]istory a-Ad precedent," the Court
stated, "provide no clear answers" in determining whether the
Seventh Amendment guarantee applies to claim interpretation."3 Instead, the Court based its affirmation on "functional
considerations. 4
In surveying such functional considerations, the Court first
explained the rationale behind the long-standing rule that interpretation of written instruments is a matter of law for the
court to decide. 5 Judges, not juries, the Court stated, possess
training and discipline in the construction of written instruments, 6 and patent interpretation, in particular, requires
such special training." Thus, judges are more likely to be correct in interpreting patents." Juries, lacking such practice
and training, cannot be expected to interpret patent claims
correctly, and thus, are likely to be wrong if given the opportunity to do so. 9
With regard to conflicting expert testimony and the "technical language exception," the Court conceded, in contradiction
to the CAFC's holding, that there could be cases in which a
factual element will arise in the process of interpreting claims
as a matter of law: "It is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made about the experts who testify in patent
cases, and in theory there could be a case in which a simple
credibility judgment would suffice to choose between experts."" Regardless of this factual element, however, the

Id. at 1395.
"' Id. ("[Flunctional considerations also play their part in the choice between
judge and jury to define terms of arL ... [Wihen an issue 'falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the factflaw distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.' So it turns out here, for judges, not juries are the
better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms.") (quoting Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
73

75 Id.

Id.
Markman II1, 116 S. Ct at 1387.
78 Id.
76

79 Id.
8 Id. at 1395 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in Metaullics Systems Co. V.
Cooper, 100 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the CAFC stated in dicta that the Supreme

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 279

Court refused to characterize claim interpretation as a mixed
question of law and fact. It did so for two reasons. First, without citing any authority in support of its contention, the Court
declared that factual disputes regarding expert credibility and
bias are rarely, if ever, dispositive of the issue of claim interpretation." Second, in cases where such factual issues could
be dispositive, the Court found that the functional considerations forming the basis for the general rule on document
interpretation outweigh litigants' right to a jury trial.82 The
Court based this finding on the assertion that credibility determinations that must be made in considering conflicting expert
testimony are subsidiary to the ultimate question of interpretation." Thus, since judges are vested with the general task of
construing the patent, they are in a better position to ascertain
whether an expert's proposed interpretation fully comports
with the language of the patent.' Claim interpretation is document interpretation, the Court stated, and, notwithstanding
its factual underpinnings, we would rather have judges interpreting such complex subject matter."

Court's contradictory statements in this regard renders claim construction a mixed
question of law and fact, and that the CAFC may be required to defer to a trial
court's factual findings on claim construction. Id. at 939 ("Even if this court were
to disregard the Supreme Court's functional rationale, because claim construction
is a mixed question of law and fact, see Markman, - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at
1390 (classifying claim construction as "a mongrel practice" consisting of factual
and legal components), we may be required to defer to a trial court's factual findings. Where a district court makes findings of fact as a part of claim construction,
we may not set them aside absent clear error. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous . . .
81 Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1395 ("[Olur own experience with document construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many cases like that (in
which a credibility determination would suffice to choose between competing interpretations advanced by expert witnesses.]").
82 Id. at 1395-96.
8 Id. at 1395 ("[Alny credibility determinations will be subsumed with the

necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document ...

84 Id.

"' Id. at 1395-96.

.
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III. THE WRONG RESULT FOR THE WRONG REASONS

A. The Wrong Reasons
By making it the court's obligation to determine the meaning of claim language, the Markman decision requires judges
to consider factual evidence regarding scientific principles and
the state of the art in certain cases.' Such evidence is offered
"to aid the court in coming to a correct conclusion as to the
true meaning of the language employed in the patent.' Although the court must regard intrinsic evidence-the patent
and its prosecution history-as primary evidenceP the court
must also consider extrinsic evidence, such as expert or inventor testimony, when the intrinsic evidence is not dispositive:
"if, after consideration of all th[e] [intrinsic] documentation,
the judge cannot readily resolve the meaning of the claims, he
resorts to extrinsic evidence to shed light on them.' Such
extrinsic evidence may be helpful to explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that
appear in the patent and prosecution history."2 The helpfulness of extrinsic evidence is not debated; however, the CAFO's
and Supreme Court's holdings with regard to conflicting extrinsic evidence is new and ill-conceived.
Before Markman H, the CAFC consistently held that claim
interpretation is a mixed question of law and fact-that ultimately the issue of claim scope is a question of law because the
result gives legal effect to claim terms, but it may require the
resolution of certain factual disputes which are within the
jury's province to decide.9 In Markman I, however, the
Markman Iff, 116 S. Ct. at 1395-96.
Markman II, 52 F.3d at 980.
"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 987.
" Id. at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring). The Federal Circuit has even held that a
district court's rejection of expert testimony to resolve claim disputes is an abuse
of discretion. Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ('Although use of experts is generally a matter of discretion with the trial judge, that
discretion is not unlimited. In a patent case involving complex scientific principles,
it is particularly helpful to see how those skilled in the art would interpret the

claim.").
Markman II, 52 F.3d at 980.
9' Arachnid Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972 F.2d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(claim interpretation "may require the factfinder to resolve certain factual issues");
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CAFC held that claim interpretation is a question of law solely
for the court to decide. The Supreme Court agreed with this
holding, although it conceded that "in theory there could be a
case in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to
choose between experts." 2
In cases where credibility assessments do suffice to choose
between experts or where conflicting extrinsic evidence must
be considered to interpret claim language, the determination is
one based in fact, rather than law.93 The judicial actor
charged with making the determination must evaluate human
conduct and demeanor in deciding which conflicting interpretation comports with the intrinsic evidence.' Such responsibilities have traditionally been left to the jury.95 The CAFC's conLemelson v. General Mills Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("[U]nderlying factual issues in dispute become the jury's province to resolve in the
course of rendering its verdict on infringement."); Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885
F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A disputed issue of fact may, of course, arise in
connection with interpretation of a term in a claim if there is a genuine evidentiary conflict created by the underlying probative evidence pertinent to the claim's
interpretation.") (emphasis added); Palumbo v. Don-Joy, 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen the meaning of a claim is disputed and extrinsic evidence is
necessary to explain that term, then an underlying factual question arises.");
McGill v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (If "the meaning of a
term of art in the claims is disputed and extrinsic evidence is needed to explain
the meaning, construction of the claims could be left to a jury. In [this] instance,
the jury cannot be directed to the disputed meaning for the term of art.") (emphasis added).
92 Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
'3 E.g., Markman II, 52 F.3d at 1000 (Newmnan, J., *dissenting). In her dissent
in Markman II, Federal Circuit Court Judge Newman had much to say about the
majority's conclusion that factual disputes do not arise when conflicting extrinsic
evidence is introduced at the trial level:
In patent infringement litigation there is often a factual dispute as to
the meaning and scope of the technical terms or words of art as they are
used in the particular patented invention. When such dispute arises its
resolution is not a ruling of law, but a finding of fact.
Id. Further, Judge Newman stated that the "technical language exception" that
applies in other areas of law must likewise apply in patent claim interpretation
cases:
Inventor's usages of words to describe their inventions, and the meanings
thereby conveyed to persons skilled in the field, are questions of fact, not
matters of law, in patent documents as in other written instruments.
Disputes concerning the meaning and usage of technical terms and
words of art arise in many areas of law. These disputes are resolved by
the triers of fact, whether judge [in a bench trial] or jury, in their established roles in the adjudicatory process.
Id. at 1007.
" Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
9 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility de-
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tention that credibility assessments do not arise in cases where
conflicting extrinsic evidence is considered, and the Supreme
Court's claim that it is "doubtful that trial courts will run into
many cases like that,"6 ignore the evidentiary underpinnings
involved in these patent cases. 7
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reliance on functional
considerations is misplaced. Such reliance was based primarily
on the assertion that judges, not juries, are better suited to
resolve all aspects of claim interpretation because judges regularly construe written instruments. 3 This conclusion, the
Court stated, is constitutionally permissible because the issue
of whether the Seventh Amendment applies to claim interpretation "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and
a simple historical fact."

terminations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge."); Biler v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, 114, 117 (1985) (When "the issue involves the credibility of witnesses
and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling
and familiar justifications for leaving" the determination to the fact finder.); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960) (When "the decision of the issue
presented . . . must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding
tribunal's experience with mainsprings of human conduct.., the close relationship of [such decision] to the data of practical human experience ... confirm[s) us
in our conclusion that primary weight in this area must ba given to the conclusions of the trier of fact."); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1204 (9th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("[W]hether an individual acted 'reasonably' by community
standards" is an issue to be left to the finder of fact.).
Markman IfI, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
Markman 1I, 52 F.3d at 1007 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("It has not heretofore been seriously challenged that findings of the weight and credibility of evidence are for the jury, whether the issues are technologic, scientific, or otherwise."); see Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944) (The
weight and credibility of a witness's testimony 'belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men; and so long as we have jury trials they should
not be disturbed in their possession of it . . . ."); see also In re Mahurkar Double
Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (Easterbroak, J., sitting by designation) ("[Jludges should not pretend that
all nominally 'legal' issues may be resolved without reference to facts.").
Markman I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). Interestingly, the
Court in Miller also stated that, in contrast to a situation where an issue falls
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, where
"the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an
evaluation of demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving
the process of applying law to fact to the [finder of fact] and according its determination presumptive weight." Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
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The Court's argument does not ring true. There are two

reasons why. First, the Court's reliance upon such functional
considerations is misplaced. Functional considerations may
play a role in choosing between judge and jury only where an
issue "falls in between a pristine legal standard and a simple
historical fact," that is, where an issue is neither one nor the
other.0 0 But an issue does not "fall in between" simply because it consists of both. Claim interpretation need not be
characterized as purely legal or purely factual; it may be characterized as a mixed question. All aspects of claim interpretation do not become matters of law simply because history and
precedent are silent on the issue. The Seventh Amendment,
and federal law of procedure developed pursuant to it, require
the issue of claim interpretation to be one of both law and
fact.10 '
Second, even if functional considerations may play a role
in choosing between judge and jury, such considerations do not
convert matters of fact into matters of law. When appropriate,
rules of law are applied to the facts Qf a particular case. "
The mere existence of this basic jurisprudential procedure does
not transform findings of fact into findings of law.0 3 Nor does
the fact that the written instrument to be construed is a patent, to the extent that patent interpretation requires a height-

100 Markman III,
101 When factual

110 S. Ct. at 1395.
issues arise at trial, the Seventh Amendment dictates that
such issues will be decided by a jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The only exception
arises when such factual issues are not fundamental elements of the right.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). In patent cases, the
ultimate issue of infringement is unquestionably a jury issue. Markman Ill, 116 S.
Ct. at 1389. Because infringement nearly always depends on construction of the
claims, such construction is likewise nearly always a fundamental element of the
right to a jury trial. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 991-93 (Mayer, J., concurring).
In addition, when genuine issues of material fact exist at trial, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 dictates that such issues are not subject to summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (MThe [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."). See also Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("AIlthough claim construction is a legal question, underlying fact disputes
may arise pertaining to extrinsic evidence that might preclude summary judgment
treatment of claim construction.").
"02E.g., Markman II, 52 F.3d at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting).
103 E.g., Id.
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ened level of legal training,1 0 4 necessitate such a
conversion.0 5 Similarly, factual findings regarding claim interpretation are not rendered matters of law simply because
judges give legal effect to patents.0 6 The Supreme Court's
assertion that all aspects of claim interpretation are questions
of law simply because some aspects of claim interpretation are
questions of law more closely resembles circular reasoning
than informed judicial decision-making.
B. The Wrong Result: The Mischiefs of Markman
The Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the importance
of factual elements in claim interpretation has had a profound
effect on patent practice and litigation. In particular, two exceedingly negative consequences regarding the well-established
roles of trial judges, juries, and appellate courts have resulted
from the Court's characterization. First, by proclaiming all
aspects of claim interpretation to be legal, the Supreme Court
created an impermissible "complexity exception" to the Seventh
Amendment for patent cases." 7 This result takes from the
jury and gives to the judge the power to find facts crucial to
the outcome of the case.0 s Such an exception usurps a major
part of the functions of both trial judge and jury in patent
cases. Second, the characterization has derogated what is supposed to be the "main event" in the adjudicatory process, the
trial, to a "tryout on the road."0 ' As a matter of law, claim
Assuming that's what the Supreme Court meant when it stated that
"[platent construction in particular 'is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and practice.' " Markman III, 116 S. CL at 1395 (quoting
Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740)).
" Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ('So
long as the Seventh Amendment stands, the right to a jury trial should not be
rationed, nor should particular issues in particular cases be treated differently
from similar issues in other types of cases."); see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.. 474,
486 (1935); Markman II, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring).
1" See Reed v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimac River, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 274, 288-289 (1850) ("It is true that it was the duty of the court to give a
But after all this is
construction to the [written instrument] in question ....
done, it is still a question of fact . . . for the jury to decide, whether [the
plaintiffs or defendant's interpretation fully comports with the written instrument.]").
0 See supra notes 17, 95 & 97.
' See supra notes 17, 95 & 97.
1'

1

See supra note 18.
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interpretation will be reviewed de novo by the CAFC." °
Thus, any "legal" findings below with regard to conflicting extrinsic evidence, although essentially factual, will not be afforded any deference and will be decided anew by the appellate
court."' This result eliminates the well-established, defined
differences between the roles of trial and appellate courts, and
vests adjudicative authority
over patent disputes in the CAFC,
2
a federal appellate court."

1.

The Creation of an Impermissible "Complexity
Exception" to the Seventh Amendment in Patent
Cases

In characterizing all aspects of claim interpretation as
questions of law, the Supreme Court has created a dichotomy
between the rules governing the right to jury trials in patent
suits for damages and the rules governing the right to jury
trials in other suits for damages."' In Markman Ill, the Supreme Court found that where a factual element exists as to
claim interpretation, "a jury's capabilities to evaluate demeanor, to sense the 'mainsprings of human conduct,' or to reflect
community standards is much less significant than a Ijudge's]
trained ability to evaluate the [conflicting] testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent.""4 In all other
types of cases, a jury's prerogative to evaluate demeanor, human conduct, or community standards is protected by the Seventh Amendment.' 15 Such a distinction creates an impermissible "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amendment and
hinders the judicial process in patent cases.'
E.g., Markman II, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring).
. Id. at 990-92.
112 Id.
" Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1395-96.
.. Id. (citations omitted).
. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 17 and 97 and accompanying text. I believe that the Supreme Court intended to create such an exception, albeit indirectly, in Markman
III, affording great deference to and affuming the CAFC's similar creation of a
"complexity exception" in patent cases in Markman I. Apparently, given the controversial nature of such an exception, based as it is on the belief that learned
judges are smarter than incompetent juries, see SRI Intl v. Matsushita Electronic
Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127-28 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markey, C.J., additional
views), neither the CAFC nor the Supreme Court wanted to come right out and
10
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Such a dichotomy is arguably permissible if patent cases

are so inherently complex so that all patent suits are "beyond
the ability of a jury to decide by rational means."" However,
it is not the case that all patents, by their very nature, are too
complex for a jury. Rather, some patents may contain difficult
scientific and technical terms. Even so, there is no compelling
reason to remove technically complex subject matter from the
realm of jury consideration.'
Judges are no more knowl-

edgeable than the average citizen with regard to complex scientific subject matter.
Moreover, the CAFC's decision in Markman II oddly departs from prior patent law principles. The CAFC has consis-

tently held that the same rules apply to patent cases as apply
to other suits for damages." In addition, Congress has repeatedly rejected requests for specialized courts limited to

decision-making on complex technological subject matter.'
Instead, as several commentators have explained, effective

judicial management of the complex case, via careful explanation and presentation of evidence and mindful supply of in-

structions
to juries, is the key to proper adjudication of such
21
cases.1

The problem with the courts deciphering complex termi-

nology is that any such determination will necessarily be influenced by the credibility and bias of the expert witnesses presay what they believed to be true.
1,,
See SRI Int'l, 775 F.2d at 1129-30 (Markey, C.J., additional views) (quoting
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1086-88 (3d Cir.
1980)).
11 Markman H, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("[T]here is simply no
reason to believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve the
complex technical issues often present in patent cases."); Railroad Dynamics, Inc.
v. Stucki, 727 F.2d 1506, 1515 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984)
("There is, of course, no reason for considering patent cases as somehow out of the
mainstream of the law and rules of procedure applicable to jury trials for centuries under our jurisprudence.").
RailroadDynamics, 727 F.2d at 1515; see supra note 106.
See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
see also RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 219
(1985) ("If Congress abolished the right to jury trials in federal civil cases, it
would take a very loose construction of the Seventh Amendment to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality.").
'1See Mark A. Constantino & Daniel L. Master, Jr., The Seventh Amendment
Right To Jury Trial In Complex Civil Litigation: Historical Perspectives and a
View From the Bench, 12 AIPLA Q. J. 279, 284 (1984).
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senting such evidence. Credibility determinations involve evaluations of witness demeanor and conduct. These evaluations
are best determined by a group of citizens who are presumed
to be fitted for it based on their natural intelligence and practical knowledge of human behavior. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has stated that where the "mainsprings of human conduct" are
to be evaluated, the "primary weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of fact."22 A judge may
make such determinations, as a substitute for the jury, only
with the consent of both parties. Neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court may take such prerogative from the jury. Yet,
the complexity exception has unjustifiably usurped the123major
functions of both trial courts and juries in patent cases.
In Elf Atochem North America v. Libbey Owens Ford
Co., a recent patent infringement case, the trial court reviewed the extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties and
determined that each party presented viable contentions with
regard to the meaning of certain terms in the claims of the
patent-in-suit." In fact, it appeared to the court that such
extrinsic evidence created a "genuine dispute of material fact"
over the proper interpretation to be accorded certain terms in
the patent claims. 26 In describing the nature of the dispute,
the court explained that issues regarding expert witness credibility and bias had been raised by both parties and that it appeared such concerns were valid. 27 Consequently, the court
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 279, 289 (1960).
E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 850
(D. Del. 1995).
124 894 F. Supp. 844 (D. Del. 1995).
1
Id. at 850. The extrinsic evidence in Elf Atochem was offered in support of
each party's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 848. Such extrinsic evidence
included technical dictionaries, chemistry textbooks, statements by witnesses in
depositions, and affidavits by technical expert witnesses. Id.
126 Id. at 850.
127 Id. at 850-51. Apparently, plaintiffs expert had little to no experience in the
technology at issue in the suit. His only experience had occurred ten years earlier,
at which time he had spent some months dabbling in the area, but he had had no
contact with the technology since. Id. at 851. In addition, defendants expert, although very well qualified, had had a long-standing business relationship with the
defendant. Id. In fact, the defendant was the exclusive licensee of his patents in
the subject matter. Id. Defendant's expert had received over $600,000 in royalties
from the defendant the previous year alone. Id. Furthermore, the invention he
developed was one of the products accused of infringing plaintiffs patents in the
case at hand. Id.
122

12
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determined that it normally would have denied the motions for
summary judgment and allowed the parties to try the issues to
a jury.' However, several months prior to the decision in Elf
Atochem, the CAFC decision in Markman II had come down.
As a result, and against what the trial court believed to be the
proper ruling under the law of summary judgments, the court
in ElfAtochem was precluded from sending the genuine factual
dispute to the jury.' This result, the court stated, is an "unusual procedure" for a district court to maintain in patent
cases."3 Furthermore, the court concluded that in cases
where a genuine factual dispute exists as to claim term meaning, characterization of claim interpretation as a legal matter
is inconsistent with Rule 56 of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court precedent, and, in addition, may
have an adverse impact on the litigants' Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial."'
The "unusual procedure" endured by the court in Elf
Atochem has become commonplace in post-Markman patent
suits.'32 Determinations of expert witness credibility and bias
very often are subsidiary issues in claim interpretation at the

Id. at 850.
Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850.
Id. at 858.
131 Id. at 849, 858. Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that "[tlhe [summary]
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
0 FED. R. CW. P.
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ...
56(c).
See Lee's Aquarium & Pet Prods., Inc. v. Putnam Pet Prods., Inc., 951 F.
Supp. 1469, 1474 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Allied Gator, Inc. v. NPK Constr. Equip., Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 694, 699 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Ultradent Prods., Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (D. Utah 1996); Environetics, Inc. v. Mfipore
Corp., 923 F. Supp. 344, 345-46 (D. Conn. 1996); Monroe Eng'g Prods., Inc. v. J.W.
Winco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 901, 905 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Optical Coating Lab., Inc. v.
Applied Vision, Ltd., No. C-92-4689, 1996 WL 53631, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19,
1996); Rolite, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Tech., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 870, 873-74 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 n.7 (D.
Del. 1995).
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trial level.'3 3 Such determinations are inherently factual and

" See, e.g., Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333-34
n.7 (D. Del. 1995) ("Non-transcribible courtroom occurrences such as a witness's
body language, inability to maintain eye contact when confronted with a telling
question, hesitance or delay in giving an afirmative answer in a voice revealing
the truthful answer is 'no,' or the changing demeanor of a witness when shifting
from sure to treacherous footing" all occurred during the course of this trial). Interestingly, after Markman II but before Markman III, district courts were not
allowed to consider any of these courtroom occurrences in construing the claims as
a matter of law. Markman II, 52 F.3d at 986-87 ("This sort of inquiry is not appropriate, or even possible, in the context of patent litigation."). There can be only
one correct interpretation of a patent, the CAFC concluded, and thus factual disputes, including disputes over witness credibility, do not occur at the trial level.
Id.
The district court in Lucas interpreted the disputed patent claims as a matter
of law, but staunchly disagreed with Markman II's contention that trial courts do
not credit certain evidence over other evidence when confronted with conflicting
testimony regarding claim interpretation:
When two experts testify differently as to the meaning of a technical
term, and the court embraces the view of one of them, the other, or
neither while construing a patent claim as a matter of law, the court has
engaged in weighing evidence and making credibility determinations.
Lucas, 890 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 n.7. Although the Lucas court acknowledged the
CAFC's holding that no issue of claim construction may contain a factual element,
the court found that evidence weighing is essential to its function as claim interpreter and harshly criticized the CAFC's bold assertion to the contrary: "when the
[CAFC] states that the trial court does not do something that the trial court must
do to perform the judicial function, that court knowingly enters a land of sophistry
and fiction." Id. (emphasis added). Based on these findings, the Lucas court refused to follow Markman II and interpreted the claims in light of its findings on
expert witness credibility and bias:
[blound by slavish adherence to the fiction that a judge does not make
credibility determinations when confronted with testimonial extrinsic
evidence en route to pronouncing the "true" meaning of a patent claim,
this opinion has been crafted in a manner that leaves the reader, and
the reviewing court, uninformed as to the credibility assessments which,
as always, are necessary precursors to the acceptance or rejection of
testimonial evidence from competing experts. In fairness to all, those
assessments unavoidably have been made in evaluating all testimony and
in connection with exhibits relating to claim construction.
Id.
One might ask how effective this approach is in leaving the readers, including
a panel of CAFC judges, uninformed as to the true bases for the district court
opinion. After all, the court spelled it out for any reader to see. However, the
admission made by the Lucas court was made in a footnote to the opinion, specifically, footnote 7. Perhaps the Lucas court was hoping that the CAFC would not
read the footnote, after all, legend has it that "no one reads footnotes anyway."
See Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals:In Response
to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 Duke L.J. 1122, 1131; Daniel M. Friedman,
Winning on Appeal, 9 No. 3 LInGATION, Spring, 1983, at 15, 17-18. One rea3on
this may be true, according to then United States Circuit Court Judge Abner J.
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have not, until Markman, been characterized as legal.'
2. The Derogation of Any Trial Level Activity to a "Tryout
on the Road"
In addition to the above contrariety created by the decision, Markman has also imposed a new standard of review for
claim interpretation appeals. Because Markman determined
that claim interpretation is a matter of law solely for the court
to decide, appellate courts now review all aspects of claim
construction de novo. Since the issue of claim construction
often dictates the outcome in a patent infringement suit,S
this standard gives patent litigants two bites at the apple. If
claim construction at the trial level truly involved only legal
determinations, this result would not be troublesome.
However, claim construction involves a factual component.
Under the de novo standard of review, the resolution of such
factual disputes by the trial court is accorded no deference by
the appellate court. Thus, when conflicting interpretations are
offered at trial, any decision rendered by the trial court becomes meaningless on appeal. Such a result derogates the
"main event" in the adjudicatory process to a mere "tryout on
the road," thereby eliminating the well-established, defined
differences between trial and appellate courts in patent cases.
In Markman II, Circuit Judge Mayer stated in his concurrence that "the effect of this case is to make of the judicial
Mikva, is that footnotes are a pain to read: 'If footnotes were a rational form of
communication, Darwinian selection would have resulted in the eyes being set
vertically rather than on an inefficient horizontal plane." Abner J. Mi-va, Goodbye
to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647, 648 (1985).
In any case, the Supreme Court effectively reversed this part of the CAFC's
holding when it decided that credibility determinations must, of course, be made
about the experts who testify in patent cases. Markman LI, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
Regardless of these factual elements, however, the Supreme Court still characterized all aspects of claim interpretation as legal, basing its decision primarily on
"functional considerations." See supra Part H D.
" See supra notes 91, 93 & 95 and accompanying text.
Markman II, 52 F.2d at 981. Previously, credibility issues with regard to
conflicting extrinsic evidence were questions of fact and thus subject to the dearly
erroneous standard on appeal. FED. R. CrV. P. 52(a); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
I Id. at 989, 993 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("All these pages and all these words
cannot camouflage what the court well knows: to decide what the claims mean is
nearly always to decide the case.").
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process a charade, for notwithstanding any trial level activity,
this court [the CAFC] will do pretty much what it wants under
its de novo retrial."'37 This mischief is readily apparent in
Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.138 In Exxon
Chemical Patents, the only issue on appeal to the CAFC was
whether the trial court correctly interpreted the claims at
issue."' At trial, the district court interpreted the claims as a
matter of law. " ' In so doing, the court heard testimony introduced by both parties as to the proper interpretation of the
claims, including expert witness testimony regarding complex
chemical subject matter.' The trial court adopted the views
advanced by the plaintiff and its experts and instructed the
jury accordingly."
Not surprisingly, interpretation of the
claims as a matter of law decided the infringement question:
the jury verdict found defendants liable for willful infringement and, based on such finding, the court awarded plaintiffs
approximately $130 million dollars in damages, attorney's fees,
and costs.'
The defendants in Exxon Chemical Patents brought an
appeal before the CAFC, arguing that the district court's interpretation of the claims was erroneous, and thus, the jury verdict should be vacated.'" The CAFC agreed with the defendant that the trial court's interpretation was erroneous, and although not adopting the defendant's specific interpretation,
reinterpreted the claims in a way favorable to the defendant. 4 ' In addition, based on such reinterpretation, the
CAFC entered judgment in favor of the defendant on the infringement claim and vacated the jury verdict.'

13 Id.
139

at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring).
64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 77 F.3d 450 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1555.

140

Id.

1

. Id. at 1558-59.
142

Id. at 1555, 1556-59.

1

Id.

at 1555; Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d

1813, 1816 (S.D. Tex. 1994), vacated, 64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Such excessive
damages were awarded because the jury found not only that defendant had in-

fringed, but that it had done so willfully. Id. at 1814-15. Therefore, the actual
damages, $48 million, were doubled. Id. at 1816.
1" Exxon Chemical Patents, 64 F.3d at
1555-57.
"
246

Id.
Id.

at 1557-58.
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The troublesome nature of the CAFC's decision in Exxon
Chemical Patents is threefold. First, the CAFC ignored the
district court's interpretation of the claims even though such
interpretation was based upon extrinsic evidence, including
expert witness testimonial evidence. 4" The weighing of such
extrinsic evidence often entails determinations of witness credibility and bias, determinations that are best left to the trial
court hearing such evidence in person."' Appellate judges,
working with a cold record, are not privy to courtroom occurrences that go a long way in establishing a witness's credibility. The CAFC's reinterpretation of the claims in Exxon Chemical Patents, done without according any deference to the trial
court, renders meaningless the trial court activity with regard
to claim interpretation.
Second, the CAFO's decision in Exxon Chemical Patents
further hinders the judicial process because in reinterpreting
the claims, the CAFC offered an interpretation that occurred to
no one else during the case's extensive period of litigation."'
Federal Circuit Court Judge Mayer, in concurring with the
majority's denial of rehearing in the case, explained that the
CAFC's reinterpretation of the claims had no evidentiary support in the record.5 0 Such a reinterpretation further obliterates the well-established, defined differences between the roles
of trial and appellate courts in patent cases: "After Markman,
apparently the meaning of a claim has very little to do with
the parties' theories of the case and the record made in support, and everything to do with what at least two judges here
[at the CAFC] prefer regardless of the record."'' Such a result clearly vests adjudicative authority in patent cases in the

"'
1

Id at 1558-60.

See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., 894 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 n.7
(D. Del 1995).
..Id. at 1557-58; Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 77 F.3d 450,
451 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (denial of rehearing) ("Two judges have divined an interpretation of the claim that occurred to no one else in this extensive litigation.") (Mayer,
J., concurring).
" Exxon Chem. Patents, 77 F.3d at 451 (Mayer, J., concurring) ("None of the
parties or the trial court offered the interpretation that these two judges chose,
and none of the extensive extrinsic evidence about how those skilled in the art
would understand the claim supports it.).
' Id. This, Judge Mayer said, "is another example of the predicted mischief of
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc." Id. I have borrowed his label for this
Note.
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CAFC, thus truly derogating any trial level activity to a "tryout on the road."'52
Third, a reinterpretation of the claims by the CAFO that
does not comport with either the trial court's interpretation or
the appellant's asserted interpretation violates Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50.' 63 Rule 50 allows for entry of judgment as
a matter of law only in accordance with the movant's motion
for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL").&4 In Exxon Chemical Patents, defendant's appeal to the CAFC only challenged
the district court's rejection of defendant's renewed motion for
JMOL.'55 The sole issue on appeal, therefore, was whether
the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for
JMOL, i.e., whether the district court's interpretation of the
' The issue was not whether another
claims was erroneous. 56
possible interpretation of the claims, an interpretation not
argued for in the defendant's renewed motion, could be found
by the CAFC to vacate the jury's finding of infringement.' 7
The authority of an appellate court to enter a judgment
rather than a remand is severely circumscribed. If no motion
for JMOL on the issue is made an "appellate court [is] without
power to direct the district court to enter a judgment contrary
' By
to the one [the district court] had permitted to stand." 58
adopting a different interpretation of the claims on its own, the
CAFO required the appellee in Exxon Chemical Patents to
litigate during trial not only its opponent's position but also
the unknowable position of the CAFC. By entering judgment
against appellee based on this unknowable interpretation, the

112

See supra note 18.

Exxon Chem. Patents, 64 F.3d at 1568-69 (Nies, J., dissenting). Rule 50
states, in pertinent part, that a motion for JMOL "shall specify the judgment
sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the
judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2).
11.Malta v. Schuimerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992).
1" Exxon Chem. Patents, 64 F.3d at 1555. This is the typical vehicle appellants
use to appeal issues of claim interpretation.
156Id. at 1568-69 (Nies, J., dissenting).
157 Id.
15

"' Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 218 (1947); see also
Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1991)

("Quite clearly, the only available remedy upon finding error in a judgment entered on a jury verdict where [the issue not preserved by proper JMOL] is limited
to a remand for a new trial."), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 980 (1992).
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CAFC impermissibly exercised complete adjudicative authority
over the case. Not only does this result render any trial level
activity meaningless, it totally eliminates the litigant's opportunity to a trial on the merits.
Since Markman I, the derogation of any trial level activity to a "tryout on the road" has become commonplace in patent
suits.' Such derogation further occurs when the appellate
court's reinterpretation is not based on the record. When the
appellate court's reinterpretation is neither based on the record
nor permissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the
effect of Markman's mischaracterization clearly makes a charade of the judicial process, whereby the CAFC will do and has
done "pretty much what it wants under its de novo retrial.""
IV. STATUTORY PATENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER 35

U.S.C. § 112
The mischiefs of Markman arise in connection with factual
issues regarding claim interpretation that are ignored by trial
and appellate courts. Trial courts, deciding all aspects of claim
interpretation as matters of law, take from the litigants their
right to a jury trial with respect to certain disputes regarding
witness credibility and bias. Appellate courts, reviewing all
aspects of claim interpretation under the de novo standard,
reinterpret claims without affording any deference to the trial
court's findings with regard to such factual disputes. The mischiefs, therefore, arise in connection with the introduction of
extrinsic evidence regarding claim interpretation at the trial
level. The introduction of extrinsic evidence at the trial level occurs only when the judge is unable to properly interpret
the claims from the intrinsic evidence alone." Thus, the mis-

It

1.9 See J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Parts & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1568-70
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580-84 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578-81
(Fed. Cir. 1996); National Presto Indus. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1189-90
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
16 Markman II, 52 F.3d at 993 (Mlayer, J., concurring).
16 Id. at 994.
Id.; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(Extrinsic evidence may be considered if needed to assist in determining claim
term meaning, but liln those cases where the public record [intrinsic evidence]
unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any ex-
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chiefs of Markman arise because certain patents are not sufficiently unambiguous to allow judges, in construing such patents as a matter of law, to interpret claim terms without resorting to extrinsic evidence."6 In order to avoid these mischiefs, the cause of such ambiguity must be identified and
corrected. One obvious place to look is 35 U.S.C. § 112, the
statute that sets forth the disclosure requirements for patent
claims and specifications.
A. Section 112
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires a certain level of disclosure that a
potential patentee must include in any patent application:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the

art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.1

Such disclosure is commonly referred to as proper "enabling
disclosure."'65 The purpose of such enabling disclosure is twofold. First, the object is to require a patentee to describe the
invention so that others may make and use it after expiration
of the patent.'66 Second, the requirement exists so that the
public may be informed during the life of the patent of the
limits on the exclusivity asserted, "so that it may be known
which67 features may be used without license and which may
1

not."

trinsic evidence is improper.").
163

14

See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).

E.g., Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1 See, e.g., Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938).
Because the principles described in this Part IV A are longstanding, and the enactment of § 112 was intended to codify them, I will, in this Part IV A, cite to
the older leading cases establishing such principles with the knowledge that such
cases do not interpret § 112 in particular, but rather establish said principles that
were later, in 1952, codified as § 112.
16

167

Id.
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With regard to the sufficiency of a disclosure, courts have
made several important findings. First, since patents are to be
addressed to those skilled in the art, disclosure will not be
insufficient though the unskilled may be unable to understand
from it how to use the invention."6 In addition, disclosure
will be sufficient even though a skilled person might have to
make several trials or experiments before successfully making
and using the invention, so long as such required experimentation is not undue.' With regard to definitions, a patentee
may be her own lexicographer and utilize terms other than in
their strict dictionary sense as long as she defines them and is
Furthermore,
consistent in their use and interpretation.'
disclosure may be sufficient even though an inventor does not
understand or disclose the scientific principles of the invention
so long as the specification enables a skilled person to make
and use the invention." With regard to the best mode of carrying out the invention, disclosure of a single useful mode is
sufficient even where the product or process is susceptible of
being made, used, or applied in many modes.'
In addition to the enabling disclosure requirement, § 112
requires that the patent "shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."' The purpose of this requirement is similar to that of
the enabling disclosure requirement: to apprise the public of
the outer limits
what is still open to them, and to circumscribe
75
4
or boundaries of the patent's scope. In Evans v. Eaton,
the Supreme Court articulated what it is to particularly point
out and distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention.
Each claim, the Court explained, must state what the improvement is, assert how far the invention extends, and explain
what is the limit of the improvement described in the speci-

" Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 644 (1872).
A.B. Dick Co. v. Barnett, 288 F. 799, 801 (2d Cir. 1923).
E.g., Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 148 (7th Cir. 1939).
" Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435
(1911).
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1881).
1
1
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).
17 See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891).
i 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822).
10
17
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fication" In a later case, the Court held that to claim an exclusive right to use a product or process without describing
what that product or process is, is too broad, and thus not
patentable."
The enabling disclosure and particularity requirements of
§ 112 go a long way in ensuring accuracy and precision in
patent terminology. Preferably, a patent is a model of clarity,
leaves nothing to doubt or speculation, and does not require
any experiments to make or use the invention.' Thus, ideally there should be no ambiguity in claim terminology to one of
ordinary skill in the art that would require the introduction of
extrinsic evidence during litigation regarding claim interpretation.'79 Indeed, § 112 "has as its purpose the avoidance of the
kind of ambiguity that allows introduction of extrinsic evidence.""8 o
B. The Inadequacy of § 112's Disclosure Requirements in
Enabling Courts to Interpret Claim Terminology Without
Resorting to Extrinsic Evidence
Section 112 does ensure that patents include a written
description of the invention that is clear and complete enough
to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use
it. '' Unfortunately, however, § 112's disclosure requirements
do not adequately prevent ambiguity in claim terminology with
respect to claim interpretation. Very often judges are unable to
interpret claims from the intrinsic evidence alone and must
decide which of two or more competing interpretations-introduced via extrinsic evidence-is the correct one.182 Thus,
Id. at 369, 413-15.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). In Morse, the Supreme
Court considered the patent issued to Samuel Morse on his renowned telegraph
invention. The Morse patent had been held valid by the Kentucky District Court,
but on appeal the Supreme Court invalidated the eighth claim for indefiniteness,
stating that Morse "claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which
he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent. The court is of opinion that the claim is too
broad, and not warranted by law." Id.
178 See Markman II, 52 F.3d at 986-87.
176

1"

19 Id. at 986.
160Id.
161 E.g.,

1996).
1"

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.

E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey Owens Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,
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§ 112 fails to further Congressional intent to avoid the kind of
ambiguity that allows for introduction of extrinsic evidence
during litigation.
Ambiguity in claim terminology exists where certain words
in a claim are capable of being understood in two or more
possible ways.1" Conversely, ambiguity in claim terminology
does not exist where claim terms may be interpreted in only
one way. Lack of ambiguity in claim terminology exists only
where the patentee, in complying with § 112's disclosure requirements, uses words in her disclosure whose ordinary and
customary meaning is not disputable, or where the words in
the disclosure are specifically defined elsewhere in the intrinsic
evidence such that their meaning is not open to dispute."
But §112 does not require patentees to include specific definitions of claim terms in the patent. In addition, the ordinary
and customary meaning of claim terms is very often elusive,
even to those of ordinary skill in the art." Indeed, nearly all
disputes regarding claim interpretation concern conflicting
expert interpretations with respect to the ordinary and customary meaning of certain claim terms." Section 112 allows for
such disputes because it does not require patentees to define
certain words in patent claims, words that are capable of being
understood in two or more possible ways. Thus, because the
mischiefs of Markman arise only where extrinsic evidence is
introduced to clarify ambiguity in claim terminology, § 112's
failure to require disclosure sufficient to prevent such ambiguity is an underlying cause of the mischiefs of Markman.
The CAFC's recent decision in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc. 8 " supports this contention. In Vitronics,
the CAFC reconsidered the issue of whether § 112 adequately
provides courts with an intrinsic record enabling them to inter-

858-59 (D. Del. 1995); see also Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., 890 F.
Supp. 329, 333-34 n.7 (D. DeL 1995).
1"7 See Lucas Aerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 333-34 n.7; see also LIERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 36 (10th ed. 1993).
18 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
1" See Markman II, 52 F.3d at 991 (Mayer, J., concurring); Elf Atochem, 894 F.
Supp. at 858-59.
1
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
187 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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pret patent claims without resorting to extrinsic evidence."
Previously, in Markman II, the CAFC stated that no aspect of
claim interpretation involves the resolution of factual disputes,
and thus, all aspects of interpretation are matters of law, because § 112 requires proper enabling disclosure and particular8 9 The use of extrinsic evidence, the court in Markman II
ity."
stated, is not to clarify ambiguity in claim terminology, but
rather, to educate the judge with respect to unknown scientific
subject matter:
A judge is not usually a person conversant in the particular technical art involved and is not the hypothetical person skilled in the art
to whom a patent is addressed. Extrinsic evidence, therefore, may be
necessary to inform the court about the language in which the patent is written. But this evidence is not for the purpose of clarifying
ambiguity in claim terminology. It is not ambiguity in the document

that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather unfamiliarity
of the court with the terminology of the art to which the patent is
addressed."9

In an apparent retreat from this position, the CAFO in
Vitronics stated that extrinsic evidence may be used at the

trial level and, when used, is for the purpose of clarifying ambiguity in claim terminology. 9 ' In addition, the Vitronics

court stated that such ambiguity exists only where the intrinsic evidence alone does not sufficiently illustrate claim term

Id. at 1582-83.
18 Markman II, 52 F.3d at 986-87 ("If the patent's claims are sufficiently unambiguous for the PTO, there should exist no factual ambiguity when those same
claims are later construed by a court of law in an infringement action.").
19 Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
191 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Said retreat was no doubt facilitated by the Supreme Court's apparent reversal of Markman H in this regard. See supra note
133.
Such apparent reversal was expanded upon in a later case decided by a panel
of three CAFC judges. In Metaullics Systems Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938 (Fed.
Cir. 1996), Federal Circuit Judge Mayer, writing for the majority, went so far as
to state that the Supreme Court in Markman III determined that claim construction was a "mixed question of law and fact." Id. at 939. In supporting his statement, Judge Mayer pointed to language in Markman III describing claim construction as a "mongrel practice," Markman III, 116 S. Ct. at 1390, stating that such
language indicates that, according to the Supreme Court, claim construction consists both of factual and legal components. Metaullics, 100 F.3d at 939. As a result, Judge Mayer concluded, "we [the CAFC] may be required to defer to a trial
court's factual findings. Where a district court makes findings of fact as part of
claim construction, we may not set them aside absent clear error." Id.
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meaning: "Only if there [is] some genuine ambiguity in the
claims, after consideration of all available intrinsic evidence,
should the trial court [resort] to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, in order to construe claim [language]." 2
Thus, in Vitronics, contrary to its decision in Markman II, the
CAFC determined that despite § 112's statutory disclosure
requirements, ambiguity in claim terminology exists in some
cases. Certainly, the court found, current disclosure requirements under § 112 do suffice to enable those skilled in the art
to make and use an invention, but they do not enable courts to
rely exclusively on intrinsic evidence when interpreting claims
as a matter of law during litigation.
V. A STATUTORY AMENDMENT TO § 112 THAT WILL REDUCE
A COURT'S RELIANCE UPON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WHEN
INTERPRETING CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW

Before Markman, when genuine issues of material fact
regarding claim interpretation arose at the trial level, district
courts, in construing claims as a matter of law, deferred the
resolution of such factual disputes to the jury.' Claim interpretation was a mixed question of law and fact. The fact that
many patent claim terms were ambiguous, i.e., courts were not
able to construe the claims solely on the intrinsic evidence,
was not particularly troublesome. When conflicting extrinsic
evidence was introduced at the trial level, litigants were able
to present their competing interpretations to the fact finder
and such findings were upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous. In this way, all patent litigants were assured a fair trial
on the merits. In addition, statutory patent disclosure requirements under § 112, although failing to prevent ambiguity in
z" Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
19 E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey Owens Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,
849-50. In Elf Atochem, the district court stated that 'where affidavits from expert
witnesses ... present equally plausible interpretations of disputed words in a
claim, this court would [before Marhman deny summary judgment and allow a
jury to resolve the meaning of the disputed terms based upon all of the evidence
including the credibility and bias of the expert witnesses. In so doing, this court is
cognizant of Judge Easterbrok's comment that judges should not pretend that all
nominally legal' issues may be resolved without reference to facts.' " Id. (quoting
In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp.
1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation)).
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claim terminology, were considered adequate in that they enabled those skilled in the art to make and use the invention
and informed the public as to the limits of a patent's scope.
After Markman, the inadequacy of § 112 has resulted in
frequent violations of the Seventh Amendment, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and well-established case law with
respect to the differences between trial judge and jury, and
trial and appellate courts. Such mischiefs can be completely
eliminated only if patents, and their corresponding file histories, consistently and sufficiently describe claim terms so that
reliance on extrinsic evidence to interpret claims properly at
the trial level is avoided. An amendment to § 112 requiring all
potential patentees to include definitions or interpretations of
certain claim terms in the patent would go a long way in providing for such necessary disclosure.
In this regard, § 112 should be amended to add, at the end
of paragraph 2,"94 the following sentence: "The specification
shall contain definitions or interpretations for all terms of art
and all technical words in the claims, and all words that qualify terms of art or technical words in the claims." Such an
amendment would ensure that most, if not all, potentially
ambiguous claim terms are capable of being understood in only
one possible way: the way the inventor defines or interprets
the term in the specification. Furthermore, such an amendment would enable courts to assign to any term of art or technical word that meaning which is given to it in the specification. In this way, courts, in construing claims as a matter of
law, would be able to interpret the claims from the intrinsic
evidence alone, without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Such
an amendment is appropriate under the CAFC's rationale in
Markman I, and, in addition, advances the purposes behind
the current disclosure requirements codified in § 112.

14 Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 presently states that "[tlhe specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."
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In Markman II, the CAFC stated that occasionally, under
§ 112's current requirements, disclosure "will serve as a dictionary for terms appearing in the claims."" Such a situation,
the court stated, is ideal, because it avoids any reliance upon
extrinsic evidence in interpreting patent claims." The CAFC
reiterated this point in Vitronics when it said that "[tihe specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication."9 In most cases, the court stated, the specification is
dispositive, and thus, it is the single best guide to the meaning
of a disputed term." If an ideal situation for interpreting
claims as a matter of law is when the specification expressly
defines claim terms, and if the specification is the single best
guide to the meaning of a term, why are patentees not required to define claim terms in specifications? The specification
should always act as a dictionary, it should always expressly
define terms used in claims. It should not be the occasional
patent case where interpretation as a matter of law is truly a
matter of law. Questions of law should be decided not with
regard to factual determinations of witness credibility and
bias, but rather solely with regard to that which has been
disclosed in the patent and thus available in the public record
for consideration by a judge during litigation. An amendment
to § 112 that requires potential patentees to provide definitions
or interpretations of claim terms in the specification would
avoid the current problems associated with § 112 after
Markman, whereby courts are making factual determinations
under the guise of answering legal questions.
The CAFC's comparison of patents to statutes 3 further
supports such an amendment. In Markman II, the CAFC justified its comparison by stating that patents, like statutes, are
written instruments that all persons are presumed to be aware
of and are bound to follow." 0 This determination is true, and
although it does not justify characterizing all aspects of claim

1" Markman II,
196 Id. at 986.
-

52 F.3d at 979-80.

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.

191 Id.

19 Markman 1I, 52 F.3d at 987-88 (The 'appropriate analogy for interpreting
patent claims is the statutory interpretation analogy.").
2 Id. at 987.
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interpretation as legal, it does note an important similarity
between patents and statutes: both have as their purpose the
public notification of what is legal behavior and what it not. In
furthering this purpose, statutes very often contain definitions
of potentially ambiguous terms.0 1 Patents, conversely, very
often do not. An amendment requiring patents to include such
definitions would recognize the important similarity between
patents and statutes and more adequately notify the public as
to which products may be made, used, or sold without license
and which may not.
In short, an amendment requiring definitions or interpretations of claim terms in patents would significantly further
Congressional intent to avoid "the kind of ambiguity that allows introduction of extrinsic evidence" in patent cases.0 '
Without such an amendment, § 112 will remain ineffectual in
advancing such purpose and the mischiefs of Markman will
continue to hinder the judicial process in patent cases.
CONCLUSION

In Markman II & III, the CAFC and the Supreme Court
mischaracterized certain aspects of patent claim interpretation
as questions of law, impermissibly creating a "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amendment and wrongfully eliminating the well-established, defined differences between trial
judge and jury, and trial and appellate courts in patent cases.
That characterization has brought to light the failure of statutory patent disclosure requirements to provide judges responsible for interpreting claims as a matter of law with an intrinsic
record enabling them to so interpret claims without resorting
to the consideration of outside or extrinsic evidence. These
detriments could be avoided or corrected if 35 U.S.C. § 112 was

201 United States v. James, 60 F. 257, 258 (N.D. Ill.
1894) (Statutes are "a
series of definitions which, for the purposes of public safety or welfare, designate
certain acts" as illegal.); United States v. Trice, 30 F. 490, 491 (W.D. Tenn. 1887)
(definitions in statutes are used to prevent disputes over the meaning of words);
Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1006, 1010 (B.T.A. 1934)
(Definitions in statutes exist in order to "establish a definite inflexible standard, to
remove the uncertainties and obviate the variables constantly impeding efficient
administration" of statutory law.).
202 Markman II, 52 F.3d at 986.
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amended to require greater disclosure in the form of definitions or interpretations of certain claim terms. Such an amendment is merited under Markman H and advances the purposes
behind the enactment of § 112.
Louis S. Silvestri*
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